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THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT AND MARKET EXCLUSIVITY FOR
GENERIC DRUG MANUFACTURERS: AN ENTITLEMENT OR AN
INCENTIVE?
ASHLEE B. MEHL*
INTRODUCTION
The United States patent system is the driving force behind pharma-
ceutical innovation in the United States today.1 Patent protection allows a
research-based pharmaceutical firm to use market exclusivity to recover the
tremendous investment necessary to discover and develop new drugs; it
also ensures the company's ability to further profit from its innovations
before generic drug manufacturers can copy and market the drug at a
greatly reduced cost.2 Without strong intellectual property rights, innova-
tion and pharmaceutical development in research-based firms would dete-
riorate and consumers might not have access to the medicines they need.3
On the other hand, United States consumers often do not want to pay the
prices that these firms charge for their patented products. 4 Therefore, the
work of generic firms in providing lower-cost versions of off-patent drugs
is crucial to ensuring that the American public is able to fully benefit from
the medical innovation and technology produced by research-based firms. 5
Unfortunately, in the past, the expense and time required for a generic
manufacturer to have its own version of a new drug approved by the Food
* J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2006; B.S., Chemistry,
Miami University, 2003. 1 would like to thank Professor Timothy Holbrook for his invaluable guidance
and assistance with this paper, and my parents, Devon and Natalie Mehl, and my sister, Kimberly
Moder, for their constant love and support.
1. See Gregory J. Glover, M.D., J.D., Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am., Competition in the
Pharmaceutical Marketplace, Part II, Address Before the Federal Trade Commission and the Depart-
ment of Justice-Antitrust Division (March 19, 2002).
2. Id.
3. See id. (patent protection promotes innovation, which leads to the development of the new
drugs that eventually become available in generic form at the expiry of patent rights).
4. Douglas A. Robinson, Note, Recent Administrative Reforms of the Hatch- Waxman Act: Lower
Prices Now in Exchange for Less Pharmaceutical Innovation Later? 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 829, 830
(2003).
5. Senator Hatch recently confirmed the importance and success of the Hatch-Waxman Act,
commenting that it "is of great importance to my fellow Utahns and the rest of the American public as it
saves an estimated $8 to $10 billion for consumers each year." 149 CONG. REc. S16104, 16104 (daily
ed. Dec. 9, 2003) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
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and Drug Administration (the "FDA") was substantial and deterred many
generic firms from doing so. 6
Congress attempted to solve this problem by establishing a regulatory
framework to strengthen incentives for continued innovation by research-
based firms while simultaneously expediting and encouraging earlier mar-
ket entry of generic drugs.7 The result was the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Restoration Act of 1984, more commonly known as the Hatch-
Waxman Act (the "Act"). 8 In order to reach its goal, Congress used the Act
to create a delicate balance between the rights of research-based firms and
generic firms, a balance crucial to the American pharmaceutical industry
and the public alike.9 This Note analyzes how a particular provision of the
Act, the generic exclusivity provision, promotes the Act's policies, and this
Note then proposes an amendment to ensure that it continues to do so.
In addition to expediting the market entry of generic drugs after patent
expiration, Congress also intended the Act to encourage generic firms to
challenge drug patents in the midst of their terms. 10 A generic firm success-
fully challenges a patent when it creates a generic version of the patented
drug that does not infringe, or when it establishes the patent's invalidity."
This allows the generic firm to market its product immediately, 12 driving
down drug prices for consumers earlier than otherwise would have been
possible. 13
6. Prior to the Act, generic manufacturers had to perform their own safety and efficacy studies on
the drug product, even though those studies were duplicative of the pioneer manufacturer's efforts to
receive FDA approval for the brand-name drugs. FED. TRADE COMM'N., GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR
TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 3-4 (2002). The high cost and time commitment required for
this process was likely a significant reason that approximately 150 off-patent brand-name drugs did not
have generic equivalents before the Hatch-Waxman Act was passed in 1984. Id. at 4.
7. See Robinson, supra note 4, at 830.
8. Id.
9. Senator Hatch commented that congressional debate over amendment of the Act must "ob-
serve the principle of balance contained in the original 1984 law so that both research based firms and
generic firms receive new incentives that will allow them to continue to produce and distribute the
products that the American public deserves." 149 CONG. RFC. at 16104.
10. Id.
11. See 149 CONG. REC. S16104, 16106 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2003) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
12. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000). The Act provides that "[if
the applicant made a [paragraph IV] certification... the approval shall be made effective immediately
unless, before the expiration of 45 days after the date on which the notice... is received, an action is
brought for infringement of the patent that is the subject of the certification .... 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2005). On the other hand, if the pioneer does file suit within the forty-five-day
window, the Act provides that the abbreviated new drug application "shall be made effective upon the
expiration of the thirty-month period beginning on the date of the receipt of the notice provided ......
Id.
13. The Congressional Budget Office conducted a study of pharmacy data in 1993 and 1994 and
found that the average price of a generic prescription was half that of the same brand-name prescription,
saving consumers an estimated eight to ten billion dollars in 1994 alone. FED. TRADE COMM'N., supra
note 6, at 9.
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Congress included the generic exclusivity provision in the Act to pro-
vide an additional incentive to encourage these patent challenges. The pro-
vision rewards the first generic firm to challenge a drug patent (the "first-
filer") with 180 days of generic market exclusivity, during which time no
other generic version of the same drug may enter the market. 14 This quasi-
monopoly is given in exchange for the important public benefit produced
by the efforts of those generic firms: earlier consumer access to less expen-
sive generic versions of the drugs that are often essential to consumers'
well-being. 15
However, the FDA and the courts have disagreed on how to best im-
plement the provision. 16 When a generic firm challenges the pioneer's pat-
ent as invalid or not infringed, the pioneer has the ability to contest that
challenge in court before the generic product can enter the market. 17 Not
surprisingly, in most cases the pioneer firm sues to contest the generic
firm's challenge and preserve its patent term. 18 The generic exclusivity
provision, however, makes no mention of how that litigation might affect
the award of generic exclusivity. 19 The provision simply prevents all ge-
neric versions of a drug for which a previous application has been submit-
ted from entering the market until the first-filer's exclusivity has expired.20
The FDA's initial regulations required that the first-filer be sued by the
patentee and successfully defend itself in that lawsuit (the "successful de-
fense requirement"), 21 before that first-filer could receive generic exclusiv-
14. Senator Hatch recently discussed Congress's intentions to use exclusivity to provide an incen-
tive for early patent challenges. 149 CONG. REC. at 16104.
15. See FED. TRADE COMM'N., supra note 6, at 9 (discussing consumers' savings as a result of the
availability of generic drug products).
16. The FDA promulgated its final successful defense requirement in the face of a district court
decision that held the regulation invalid. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg.
28872, 28895 n.l (proposed July 10, 1989) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 10, 310, 314, 320). The
appellate court later officially invalidated the regulation. Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060,
1076 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
17. The pioneer has forty-five days in which to file suit against the generic that attempts early
market entry with a paragraph IV certification. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). If the pioneer sues, the
FDA automatically stays approval of the ANDA for thirty months, preventing the generic from entering
the market. Id.
18. An FTC study revealed that the pioneer sues the first-filer 72 percent of the time. FED. TRADE
COMM'N., supra note 6, at 14.
19. The Act simply provides that if an ANDA application "is for a drug for which a first applicant
has submitted an application containing such a certification, the application shall be made effective on
the date that is 180 days after the date of the first commercial marketing of the drug ... by any first
applicant." 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I).
20. Id.
21. See Mova Pharm., 140 F.3d at 1065 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(c)(1) (1994), the previous
regulation).
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ity under the Act.22 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, however, invali-
dated the successful defense requirement as contrary to the provision's
plain language. 23
Since that time, the FDA has awarded exclusivity to the generic firm
that is first-in-time to challenge the drug patent, regardless of whether liti-
gation ensues thereafter. 24 Although recent provisions provide for forfeiture
of generic exclusivity, reducing some of the delays that were caused by the
first-to-file regime, problems remain regarding the exclusivity provision,
and further action is necessary to ensure that exclusivity awards are granted
consistently with the Act's purposes.25
In order to reconcile exclusivity awards with the Act's underlying
purpose of facilitating the earliest possible market entry of generic drugs,
prevent gaming of the system that delays generic competition, and ensure
that exclusivity awards provide a continuing incentive for legitimate patent
challenges, Congress should amend the Act to provide for forfeiture of the
first-filer's exclusivity when the first-filer is not the first generic firm to
successfully challenge the pioneer patent.
Part I of this Note explores the history and policy of the Act and ex-
plains the delicate balance it created between rights of pioneer drug com-
panies and the ability of generic firms to enter the market with their own
products. Part II examines the dispute that arose out of the generic exclu-
sivity provision of the Act, and details the conflicting reasoning of the FDA
and the courts in interpreting that provision. Part III outlines the current
state of generic exclusivity law in light of the recent amendments imple-
mented to prevent abuse of the system. Lastly, Part IV proposes a solution
to the remaining problems, which ensures that grants of generic exclusivity
facilitate generic competition and provides an appropriate incentive and
reward to generic firms that challenge pharmaceutical patents.
22. The FDA enacted the successful defense requirement according to its "longstanding interpre-
tation of the act," Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations; Patent and Exclusivity Provisions,
59 Fed. Reg. 50338, 50353 (Oct. 3, 1994) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314), even though it acknowl-
edged that the Act could "be interpreted in several ways .... Abbreviated New Drug Application
Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. 28872, 28894 (proposed July 10, 1989) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 10,
310, 314, 320).
23. Mova Pharm., 140 F.3d at 1076.
24. See Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Friedman, 162 F.3d 1201, 1204-05 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (explaining
that a decision from the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which invalidated the FDA's successful defense
requirement, required the FDA to "go back to the drawing board" and grant exclusivity to first-filers
regardless of whether they were sued by the pioneer).
25. The forfeiture provisions enacted in 2003 are detailed later in this Note. See 21 U.S.C. § 355
(j)(5)(D) (listing forfeiture events).
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I. THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND POLICY
A. Policy Motivations and Enactment
Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration
Act of 1984, more commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, to facili-
tate earlier market entry of generic drugs while protecting the patent rights
of pioneer drug manufacturers. 26 Put simply, the Act allows the generic
manufacturer (the "generic") to use the patented drug information to pre-
pare its own FDA application prior to expiration of the patent rights, pro-
vides an abbreviated process for FDA approval of generic drug
applications, and protects the patent rights of the research-based drug com-
pany (the "pioneer") by adding up to five years of exclusivity onto its pat-
ent term. 27 Furthermore, the Act allows the generic to seek market entry
prior to expiration of the pioneer's patent term by challenging the patent as
invalid or not infringed by its generic product.28 Once the generic makes
that challenge, the pioneer has the ability to sue the generic to contest that
claim and prevent the generic's early market entry.29
Prior to the Act, the patent rights of pioneer drug companies were di-
luted by the significant time gap between their receipt of patent protection
on a new drug and the FDA approval necessary to begin to sell that new
drug on the market. 30 Typically, when the pioneer makes a potentially im-
portant discovery, it protects that innovation by immediately applying for a
patent. 31 However, regardless of any patent rights that attach to it, a new
drug cannot be marketed without FDA regulatory approval. 32 To begin that
process, the pioneer must file a new drug application (an "NDA") with the
FDA that contains extensive safety and efficacy data for the drug, allowing
the FDA to determine the drug's marketability. 33 Because the patent term
runs throughout this approval process, by the time the FDA has approved
the drug and the pioneer is able to begin marketing it, the pioneer's effec-
tive patent term has been significantly shortened. 34 To compensate, the Act
26. See 149 CONG. REc. S16104, 16104 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2003) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (dis-
cussing Congress's intent in first drafting the Act).
27. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661,671, 676 (1990).
28. Id. at 677.
29. Id. at 677-78 (discussing the "highly artificial act of infringement" created by the Act).
30. Id. at 669-70.
31. Id. at 669.
32. See id. at 669-70 (noting that the "clock" on the patent term runs even when that patent relates
to a product, such as a new drug, that cannot be marketed without subsequent regulatory approval).
33. See id. at 669, 676.
34. Id. at 669-70.
2006]
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provides an increased term of market exclusivity on the back end of the
patent term to offset the patent term lost on the front end while the pioneer
awaits FDA approval.35 Specifically, the Act increases the patent term for
one-half of the time the drug spends in human clinical trials plus the time
for the drug application period, allowing a total extension of up to five
years. 36
Although the pioneer's effective patent term for its drug is effectively
shortened on the front end while awaiting FDA approval, prior to the Act
the term was also effectively lengthened on the back end while generics
underwent the same lengthy FDA approval process for their own versions
of the drug.37 A generic cannot market its product while it awaits FDA
approval, and the pioneer therefore retains market exclusivity during this
time despite expiration of its patent rights. 38 To speed generic drugs to the
market, the Act relaxed the generic approval process that was responsible
for the excess delay.39 As long as it demonstrates bioequivalence, a generic
may use the extensive safety and efficacy studies conducted by the pioneer
in submitting its own FDA application for a generic version of that drug.40
Because this approval process available to the generic is much less burden-
some than that of the pioneer, the application filed by a generic is known as
an abbreviated new drug application (an "ANDA"). 41 Congress created the
abbreviated approval process to encourage generic manufacturers to de-
velop their drugs and market them as quickly as possible upon expiration of
the pioneer's patent. 42
B. Generic Drugs: An Excuse from Infringement and "Artificial"
Infringement
Prior to the Act, the generic remained unable to begin the testing and
production necessary for FDA approval of its product until the pioneer's
patent term expired.43 While the Act's abbreviated generic approval proc-
35. Id. at671.
36. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch- Waxman Act and its Impact on the Drug De-
velopment Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 190 (1999).
37. Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 670.
38. The patentee essentially had a "de facto" monopoly because generics are unable to enter the
market to compete with the pioneer until they obtain their own regulatory approval. Id.
39. Id. at 676.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. In 1984, the Federal Circuit held that the manufacture, use, or sale of a patented invention
during the patent term was an act of infringement, even if that use was limited to conducting tests and
654 [Vol 81:649
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ess reduced some delay in generic market entry, this provision alone does
not reduce the pioneer's de facto monopoly term, as generics would other-
wise be unable to begin even that abbreviated process until the patent term
expired.44 Because the generic version of a drug would ideally be publicly
available as soon as the patent term expired, the Act provides that any ex-
perimental tests performed by the generic, in order to collect the bioequiva-
lence data required for its ANDA, will not constitute patent infringement. 45
To take advantage of this "safe harbor" provision, the generic must submit
a certification as to whether its generic drug infringes any of the patents
that cover the brand-name drug.46 The generic makes one of four certifica-
tions for each patent: (I) that no patent information on that brand name drug
has been submitted to the FDA; (II) that the listed patent has expired; (III)
that the listed patent will expire on a certain date, before which time the
generic will not enter the market; or (IV) that the patent is invalid or will
not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which
the ANDA was submitted.47 These options are referred to as paragraph I,
II, III, and IV certifications, respectively. 48 When the generic makes a
paragraph I or II certification, the FDA may approve its ANDA immedi-
ately.49 The FDA may approve a paragraph III certification anytime after
the patent's expiration date.50 The implications of a paragraph IV certifica-
tion are not nearly as simple.51
A generic makes a paragraph IV certification when it does not want to
wait for the expiration of the pioneer's patent rights before it begins to
market its own generic version of the drug.52 Instead, it alleges that it is
developing information needed for the generic to achieve regulatory approval. Roche Prods., Inc. v.
Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 861, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
44. Id. at 864.
45. The Patent Act provides as follows:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United
States or import into the United States a patented invention.., solely for uses reasonably re-
lated to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates
the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
46. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iv) (2000).
47. Id.
48. Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
49. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(A).
50. Id. § 355(c)(3)(B).
51. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2005). When the generic applicant makes a paragraph IV
certification the date of potential FDA approval depends on the outcome of many further procedural
events mandated by the Act. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 677-78 (1990).
52. Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 677. If the generic planned on waiting until expiration of the patent to
market its product, it would make a paragraph III certification, which indicates the date of patent expi-
ration. Id. When the generic makes that certification, it cannot begin marketing until the indicated date,
the date the patent expires. Id.
2006] 655
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justified in early market entry because its drug does not infringe the pio-
neer's patent or because the patent is invalid.53 The generic must then no-
tify the patent holder of its paragraph IV certification and provide a
detailed factual and legal explanation of why its generic drug does not in-
fringe or why the patent is invalid.54 In order to prevent frivolous paragraph
IV certifications, Congress made the mere filing of the certification itself
an act of infringement that gives the pioneer the right to sue the generic. 55
The generic "infringes" when it submits an ANDA that is "in error as to
whether commercial manufacture, use, or sale of the new [generic] drug...
violates the relevant patent. '' 56 This infringement is referred to as "artifi-
cial" because the manufacture, sale, or use of the generic drug has not yet
actually occurred.57
Once the pioneer receives the requisite notice, it has forty-five days in
which to file an infringement suit based on the generic's paragraph IV cer-
tification. 58 During that forty-five day window, the FDA may not approve
the ANDA and the generic may not file a declaratory judgment action seek-
ing patent invalidity or non-infringement. 59 If the pioneer does not sue the
generic during that forty-five day window, the FDA may approve the
ANDA immediately. 60 On the other hand, if the pioneer does file suit
within the window, the FDA may not approve the ANDA for thirty months,
or until a court rules that the patent is invalid or not infringed, whichever is
earlier.61
C. Early Market Entry by Generics Prior to Patent Expiration
If the pioneer does not sue the generic during the forty-five day win-
dow, or if the pioneer does sue the generic but the generic prevails in court
based on its invalidity or non-infringement challenge, that generic has
"successfully challenged" the patent because it has achieved the result it
sought and is able to enter the market with its product before it otherwise
53. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A)(iv).
54. Id. § 355(b)(3)(D)(ii).
55. Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 678.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C).
59. Id. (stating that the ANDA will be made effective immediately unless the pioneer files suit
within forty-five days, necessarily requiring that the FDA wait forty-five days to see if the pioneer
sues); id. § 355(c)(3)(D)(i)(I)(aa) (stating that no declaratory judgment action may be brought until the
forty-five days have passed).
60. Id. § 355(c)(3)(C).
61. Id. §§ 355(c)(3)(C)(i)-(iv).
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could have.62 By successfully challenging the pioneer, the generic has ful-
filled Congress's intent for the Act, as earlier generic market entry and its
resultant public benefit were the specific results Congress sought.63
However, in order for a generic to produce these desired results, it
must assume great risk and expense. As the generic makes its paragraph IV
certification-well before it knows whether it will be successful in its chal-
lenge-it must invest the time and money needed for product development,
pay the legal fees for evaluations of invalidity and infringement of the pio-
neer's patent, and assume the risk of the expensive and lengthy litigation
that could result if the pioneer files suit.64 To counteract this risk and ex-
pense, the Act rewards the first generic to file a paragraph IV certification
on a pioneer drug (the "first-filer") with its own 180-day period of market
exclusivity, during which time no other generic may receive ANDA ap-
proval.65 The first-filer's exclusivity begins to toll upon its first commercial
marketing of the drug (the "commercial marketing trigger"), and the rele-
vant Act provision provides that the FDA may not approve another ANDA
until 180 days after that initial marketing:
[I]f the [ANDA] contains a [paragraph IV certification] and is a drug for
which a first applicant has submitted an application containing such a
certification, the application shall be made effective on the date that is
180 days after the date of the first commercial marketing of the
drug... by any first applicant. 66
II. PROBLEMS OF GENERIC EXCLUSIVITY: FIRST TO CHALLENGE VERSUS
FIRST TO WIN
The FDA and the courts have disagreed over what qualifications are
necessary for a first-filer to be entitled to exclusivity. 67 Initially, the FDA
62. The generic challenges the pioneer patent in an attempt to enter the market before expiration
of the pioneer patent term; a "successful" challenge is therefore one that allows this desired result,
whether it does so by avoiding suit or by a lawsuit that subsequently invalidates the patent or holds it
not infringed. Senator Hatch, one of the Act's co-authors, noted his satisfaction with the Act because it
"has done so much to help consumers have access to more affordable medications." 149 CONG. REC.
S16104, 16106 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2003) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
64. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355 (j)(2)(A)(i)-(viii) (2000 & 2005) (enumerating all the required elements
of an ANDA).
65. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I) (2005).
66. Id.
67. The FDA promulgated its final successful defense requirement in the face of a district court
decision that held the regulation invalid. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg.
28872, 28895 n.1 (proposed July 10, 1989) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 10, 310, 314, 320). The
D.C. Circuit later officially invalidated the regulation. Mova Pharm., 140 F.3d at 1076.
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regulations required that the first-filer complete a successful defense of an
infringement suit brought by the pioneer before it was awarded generic
market exclusivity. 68 In other words, the FDA did not automatically grant
exclusivity to a first-filer, but awarded it only if that first-filer was sued by
the pioneer, and prevailed in the resulting litigation, before another generic
received ANDA approval for that same drug.69
This interpretation was reversed by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
in Mova Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Shalala.70 In that case, the first-filer
sought to secure its right to exclusivity throughout its litigation with the
pioneer, despite the readiness of another generic to bring its own version of
the pioneer drug to market. 71 The court sided with the first-filer, invalidat-
ing the FDA's regulation as inconsistent with the plain language of the
exclusivity provision, and preventing the FDA from approving the subse-
quent generic's ANDA until the first-filer concluded its litigation.72
The following sections detail the FDA's reasoning in promulgating its
successful defense requirement and the judicial reasoning that invalidated
it. Although both the FDA and the courts made valid points, neither pro-
vided a complete solution to the problems created by a straightforward
application of the provision's plain language.
A. The FDA: Exclusivity Contingent upon a Successful Defense
In 1989, the FDA drafted regulations that governed application of the
180-day exclusivity provision.73 The regulations were issued in 1994. 74 At
that time, the FDA had granted exclusivity to only three generics. 75 The
FDA regulation provided, in relevant part, that
[i]f an abbreviated new drug application contains a certification that a
relevant patent is invalid, unenforceable, or will not be infringed and the
application is for a generic copy of the same listed drug for which one or
more substantially complete abbreviated new drug applications were
previously submitted containing a certification that the same patent was
invalid, unenforceable, or would not be infringed and the applicant sub-
68. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. at 28894.
69. See Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations; Patent and Exclusivity Provisions, 59
Fed. Reg. 50338, 50353 (Oct. 3, 1994) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314).
70. See 140 F.3d at 1060.
71. Id. at 1062.
72. Id. at 1076.
73. See Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. at 28894.
74. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations; Patent and Exclusivity Provisions, 59 Fed.
Reg. at 50338.
75. The FDA enacted the successful defense requirement according to its "longstanding interpre-
tation of the act," id. at 50353, even though it acknowledged that the Act could "be interpreted in
several ways ... " Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. at 28894.
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mitting the first application has successfully defended against a suit for
patent infringement brought within 45 days of the patent owner's receipt
of notice submitted under § 314.95, approval of the subsequent abbrevi-
ated new drug application will be made effective no sooner than 180
days from [the date the applicant submitting the first application first
commences commercial marketing of its drug product] .76
Unless and until the first-filer successfully defended against patent in-
fringement, the FDA approved any subsequently-filed ANDAs as usual.77
In other words, before the FDA would recognize the first-filer's right to
exclusivity, the first-filer had to (1) be sued by the pioneer during the forty-
five day window, and (2) prevail in the resulting litigation. 78
The FDA reasoned that its successful defense requirement was neces-
sary for two main reasons: first, to preserve the unique function of the pro-
vision's commercial marketing trigger while preventing the provision from
providing an incentive for delay in generic competition; and second, to
prevent exclusivity from providing a windfall to a first-filer that did not
devote the time and money necessary for patent litigation.79
First, the FDA reasoned that to grant exclusivity to a generic without
regard to whether that generic had been sued rendered the commercial
marketing trigger superfluous. 80 With the exception of the generic exclu-
sivity provision, all of the Act's other exclusivity provisions are triggered
on the date the FDA approves the relevant application. 81 Uniquely, the
generic exclusivity provision is not triggered until the first-filer's first
commercial marketing of the drug, regardless of whether the FDA has al-
ready approved the ANDA.82 The FDA reasoned that Congress included
this unusual trigger because of its intent to protect a generic that was not
yet ready to go to market although the FDA had approved its ANDA.83
The need for this special protection is clear when the terms of the pro-
vision are examined as they would operate if exclusivity were triggered on
the FDA approval date. The Act provides that if the pioneer sues the first-
filer during the forty-five day window, the FDA must stay approval of the
first-filer's ANDA until thirty months have passed or until a court has de-
cided the lawsuit, whichever is earlier.84 However, those thirty months may
76. See Mova Pharm., 140 F.3d at 1065 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(c)(1) (1994)).
77. See Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations; Patent and Exclusivity Provisions, 59
Fed. Reg. at 50353.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. at 28894-28895.
81. Id. at28894.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(C)(i)iv) (2005).
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expire before the litigation has resolved. In that situation, the Act does not
prevent the FDA from approving the first-filer's ANDA, regardless of the
state of the litigation concerning the patent dispute. 85 If the generic exclu-
sivity provision were triggered in the usual way-upon FDA approval of
the ANDA-the first-filer could find itself in the midst of litigation at the
time its ANDA was approved, and its exclusivity reward would begin to
toll. However, no generic is likely to market its drug in the midst of the
litigation that will determine whether that marketing will infringe the pat-
ent.86 To do so opens the door for an award of monetary damages based on
the actual commercial manufacture and sale of an infringing product, above
and beyond the artificial infringement created by the paragraph IV certifi-
cation alone. 87 On the other hand, if the generic stays off the market, it
remains unable to benefit from its exclusivity reward and essentially for-
feits as much of that exclusivity as overlaps with the remainder of its liti-
gation. 88
It was because of this troubling scenario, the FDA reasoned, that Con-
gress deviated from its standard triggering language to provide that generic
exclusivity is not triggered upon ANDA approval, but is preserved until the
litigation concludes and the first-filer begins to commercially market its
product.89 If the first-filer is not sued by the pioneer there is no need for
this special protection (the generic can begin to market immediately upon
ANDA approval), and the unique commercial marketing trigger is use-
less. 90 The FDA reasoned that absent litigation between the pioneer and the
first-filer, not only is the commercial marketing trigger useless, but it could
be used to thwart congressional intent by allowing for further delay in ge-
neric market entry. 91 Knowing its exclusivity will be preserved all the
while, the generic can wait as long as it wants before beginning its com-
mercial marketing, triggering its exclusivity, and can keep all other gener-
ics out of the market in the interim.
On the other hand, the FDA reasoned, if the Act includes an inherent
litigation requirement within its generic exclusivity provision, the commer-
cial marketing trigger furthers the Act's underlying policy. A first-filer's
exclusivity should be preserved so long as it may still be the first firm to
85. Id. § 355(c)(3)(C) (explaining that the ANDA "may be made effective" after the thirty-month
period or upon the occurrence of any one of a list of events before the expiration of that period).
86. See Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. at 28894.
87. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(C) (2000).
88. See Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. at 28894.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 28894-28895.
91. Id. at 28894.
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bring a generic drug product to market. This result is in the best interests of
the first-filer and the public alike because it allows the first-filer to mini-
mize its potential damages 92 and thereby keep its costs low for its consum-
ers. Furthermore, this result ensures that exclusivity remains an effective
incentive to file a paragraph IV certification because it preserves that ex-
clusivity in the event that the first-filer is actually sued by the pioneer.
After the D.C. Circuit invalidated the FDA's successful defense re-
quirement, it became clear that unfettered exclusivity awards to first-filers
often produced undesirable results. 93 The first-filer maintained control over
generic competition until it decided to bring its product to market. That
control was abused, for example, when a first-filer colluded with the pio-
neer.94 In these cases, the pioneer would agree to settle its suit with the
first-filer, paying the first-filer to stay off the market during the life of the
pioneer's patent.95 This preserved the pioneer's highly profitable monopoly
and created substantial profit for the first-filer, but froze all other generics
out of the market and thereby deprived the public of all generic products.
Fortunately, recent amendments to the Act, discussed in greater detail be-
low, corrected this (and other) problems by providing that the first-filer
must forfeit its exclusivity if it colludes with the pioneer or does not market
its product within a reasonable time.96 In light of the amendments, even the
FDA might not consider its successful defense requirement beneficial
today.
In addition to preserving the function of the commercial marketing
trigger, the FDA had a second argument in support of its successful defense
requirement. The FDA reasoned that the successful defense requirement
was necessary to prevent the first-filer that was not sued from receiving a
windfall in the form of a grant of generic exclusivity. 97 Because that first-
filer had not "devoted the considerable time and money necessary for pat-
ent litigation," the FDA explained, any profits produced by its exercise of
92. Id.
93. The FTC studied the anti-competitive effects produced by agreements made between the
pioneer and the first-filer. FED. TRADE COMM'N., supra note 6, at 25. Three types of agreements were
made that delayed the start the first-filer's exclusivity period and the FDA's ability to approve subse-
quent ANDAs: (1) the pioneer paid the generic to stay off the market; (2) the pioneer licensed the
generic to use the patents for the brand-name product prior to their expiration; and (3) the pioneer
allowed the generic to market the brand-name product as a generic product, but under the pioneer's
NDA instead of the generic's ANDA. Id. at 17, 25-26.
94. See Erika King Lietzan, A Brief History of 180-Day Exclusivity Under the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 287, 305-06 (2004).
95. See id.
96. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(l) (2005).
97. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations; Patent and Exclusivity Provisions, 59 Fed.
Reg. 50338, 50353 (Oct. 3, 1994) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314).
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exclusivity were not needed to reimburse it for that expense, and would
simply provide it a windfall. 98
The FDA was incorrect in concluding that first-filers that are not sued
are undeserving of or do not need exclusivity awards. 99 First, even if the
first-filer is not sued, it is deserving of exclusivity so long as it produces the
desired public benefit. A first-filer produces the desired public benefit
when it brings its product to market. Further, assuming it goes to market
with its product reasonably quickly, that first-filer has arguably produced a
greater public benefit than the first-filer that is sued by the pioneer and
must delay generic competition until its litigation resolves. It is not fair to
deny a first-filer that has successfully designed around the patent-and is
therefore not sued by the pioneer-the reward of exclusivity.100
Second, the first-filer needs the financial reward that exclusivity pro-
vides regardless of whether it is sued by the pioneer. Because the pioneer
sues the first-filer more often than not,101 the mere filing of a paragraph IV
certification requires the first-filer to assume a substantial risk of expensive
litigation. The FDA ignored that risk.102 Additionally, in order to file its
ANDA and make its paragraph IV certification, the first-filer necessarily
makes a great investment in product development and in a legal assessment
of the validity and infringement of the pioneer's patent. 103 Those front-end
expenses exist regardless of litigation, and exclusivity should provide a
98. Id.
99. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Young, 723 F. Supp. 1523, 1526 (D.D.C. 1989).
100. As the court reasoned in the Inwood decision, the FDA's successful defense requirement
ignores the contribution that manufacturers such as Inwood [a first-filer that was not sued]
make by submitting documentation to a patent holder which is so detailed and persuasive that
the patent holder decides not to file a lawsuit. Such a contribution is equally valuable in terms
of opening up the market to generic competition.
Id.
101. The data in a FTC study revealed that the pioneer sued the generic in 72 percent of cases. FED.
TRADE COMM'N., supra note 6, at 14.
102. In reasoning that a reward of exclusivity to a first-filer that was not sued would provide that
first-filer with a windfall, the FDA focused only on the fact that the non-sued first-filer had "not de-
voted the time and money necessary for patent litigation," Abbreviated New Drug Application Regula-
tions; Patent and Exclusivity Provisions, 59 Fed. Reg. at 50353 (emphases added), completely
overlooking the expense and risk involved in filing the ANDA, before the first-filer even knows
whether it will be sued.
103. In terms of its product, the first-filer must demonstrate that its generic product has the
same active ingredient, route of administration, dosage form and strength, and proposed label-
ing as the brand-name drug. The ANDA must also contain sufficient information to demon-
strate that the generic drug is "bioequivalent" to the relevant brand-name product. As a result
of providing this information, the generic applicant is allowed to rely on the FDA's previous
findings of safety and effectiveness for the referenced brand-name drug ....
FED. TRADE COMM'N., supra note 6, at 5. In terms of legal analysis, "[a]n ANDA filer that makes a
paragraph IV certification must provide a notice to both the patent holder and the NDA filer with a
detailed statement of the factual and legal basis for the ANDA filer's assertion that the patent is invalid
or not infringed." Id. at 6-7 (emphasis added).
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reward to a first-filer that effectively uses its front-end investment to avoid
a suit by the pioneer. 104
B. The D.C. Circuit: Exclusivity Goes to the First to File
1. Inwood v. Young: A Sign of Things to Come
The D.C. District Court decided Inwood v. Young on May 12, 1989,
and the case was pending appeal when the FDA proposed its successful
defense requirement. 105 The FDA noted that the court disagreed with its
regulation, but the FDA did not alter the regulation because the Inwood
decision was vacated as moot on appeal. 106 Nonetheless, the decision set
the stage for future cases that ultimately invalidated the successful defense
requirement.107
In Inwood, the pioneer did not sue the first-filer for infringement dur-
ing the forty-five day window. 108 The first-filer therefore began marketing
its drug two weeks after its ANDA was approved, notified the FDA of that
commercial marketing, and sought 180 days of exclusivity under the
Act. 109 Because the FDA imposed a lawsuit requirement as a precondition
to the first-filer's receipt of exclusivity, it refused to grant exclusivity in
this case because the pioneer did not sue the first-filer within the forty-five
day window.1 10
In spite of the FDA's regulations, the court issued an injunction that
prevented the FDA from approving subsequent ANDAs for that drug prod-
uct until 180 days after the first-filer's initial commercial marketing.Il The
court focused on the statutory language of the Act itself and the exclusivity
provision specifically, which made exclusivity dependent upon first com-
mercial marketing of the product without any explicit lawsuit require-
ment. 11 2
104. See id. at 7 (discussing the role of exclusivity as an economic incentive to first-filers).
105. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. 28872, 28895 n.l (proposed
July 10, 1989) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 10, 310, 314, 320).
106. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations; Patent and Exclusivity Provisions, 59 Fed.
Reg. at 50353.
107. See Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 955 F. Supp. 128 (D.D.C. 1997), aff'd, Mova Pharm. Corp.
v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
108. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Young, 723 F. Supp. 1523, 1525 (D.D.C. 1989).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1527.
112. Because another provision of the Act makes an explicit reference to a lawsuit requirement, the
court presumed that Congress's omission of a lawsuit requirement in the exclusivity provision was
deliberate. Id. at 1526.
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Furthermore, the court reasoned that the FDA's "reward" policy ap-
plied equally to those generics that successfully designed around the patent
and were not sued." l 3 As discussed above, a generic that is not sued but is
first to bring its product to the market still provides the public with the
benefit of earlier access to generic drugs and thereby furthers the underly-
ing goal of the Act.1 14 For that reason, the FDA's successful defense re-
quirement unnecessarily prevented a deserving first-filer from receiving
exclusivity. 115
Additionally, the court reasoned that to require a lawsuit placed too
much control of exclusivity in the hands of the pioneer-the pioneer could
elect not to sue the first-filer and thereby extinguish generic exclusivity
altogether, as any later generics would not be the first-to-file and therefore
would not receive exclusivity even if they were to successfully defend a
lawsuit.' 16 However, this portion of the court's reasoning is unconvincing
because it is based on an illogical scenario. If the pioneer does not file suit,
the generic may enter the market immediately upon expiration of the forty-
five day window."17 Thus, the first-filer destroys the pioneer's highly prof-
itable monopoly before its patent has expired. It is not likely that the pio-
neer would elect not to sue the first-filer, giving up its own legal monopoly,
solely to defeat the quasi-monopoly rights that would accord to the first-
filer as a result of the suit. 118 However, in light of what is actually at stake
for the pioneer that does not sue the first-filer, the court's "reward" reason-
ing becomes even stronger-if the pioneer considers its case against the
first-filer too weak to justify bringing suit, even with preservation of its
monopoly at stake, it seems that the first-filer has truly earned the reward
of exclusivity.119
2. The Next Step: Mova v. Shalala
In 1997, the D.C. District Court invalidated the FDA's successful de-
fense requirement in its Mova v. Shalala decision, and the D.C. Circuit
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See id.
116. Id. at 1526-27.
117. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2005).
118. The FTC reported that the pioneer sues the first-filer approximately 75 percent of the time.
FED. TRADE COMM'N., supra note 6, at 13. In the other 25 percent of cases, the FDA approved most of
the applications, allowing market entry and destruction of the pioneer's monopoly. Id.
119. See Inwood Labs., 723 F. Supp. at 1526 (reasoning that the non-sued first-filer's ANDA may
be so "detailed and persuasive" that the pioneer decides not to file suit).
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Court of Appeals affirmed in 1998.120 The Mova decision provides an im-
portant comparison to the Inwood case because Mova illustrates the appli-
cation of the successful defense requirement when the pioneer does sue the
first-filer. 121
Mova was the first generic to file a paragraph IV certification ANDA
for a patent owned by Upjohn Company. 122 Upjohn sued Mova within the
forty-five day window, but when Mylan, another generic manufacturer,
later filed its own paragraph IV ANDA, Upjohn did not sue. 123 The FDA
therefore approved Mylan's ANDA despite the fact that Mova was the
first-filer. 124 Mova filed suit to compel the FDA to delay the approval of
Mylan's ANDA and preserve Mova's right to exercise exclusivity. 125 The
FDA argued that the statute was ambiguous as to exclusivity awards when
the first-filer was sued for patent infringement and the second ANDA ap-
plicant was not sued. 126 Therefore, the FDA reasoned that its "successful
defense" requirement was a necessary agency interpretation to resolve that
ambiguity in a way that furthered the policy of bringing generic drugs, like
Mylan's, to market earlier. 127 Because Mova had not yet successfully de-
fended the lawsuit, the FDA reasoned, it was not entitled to exclusivity. 128
Citing its earlier decision in Inwood, the court held that although the
language was "complex, and even cumbersome," it was not ambiguous and
certainly did not include a successful defense requirement. 129 Although the
court granted Mova the relief it sought, it acknowledged that the statute
might produce unintended results without the successful defense require-
ment.130 First, elimination of the requirement could encourage frivolous
ANDA filings by generics racing for the highly valuable market exclusiv-
ity. 13 1 Second, the provision could delay market entry of generic drugs
because it required later filers that were ready to go to market to wait for
the conclusion of what is often lengthy litigation (as was the situation in the
120. Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 955 F. Supp. 128 (D.D.C. 1997), affid, Mova Pharm. Corp. v.
Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
121. Id. at 129.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 129-30.
124. Id. at 130.
125. Id. at 129. The issue before the court was whether Mova was likely to be able to show that the
FDA regulation was inconsistent with the statutory language and therefore unenforceable as exceeding
the FDA's authority under the statute. See id. at 130.
126. Id. at 130.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 131.
131. See id.
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Mova case itself). 132 Still, the court rejected the FDA regulation and con-
cluded that any remedy for potential abuses lied with Congress. 133
3. The D.C. Circuit Affirms and Invalidates "Successful Defense"
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the invalidity
of the FDA regulation.134 Nonetheless, the court acknowledged that addi-
tional regulations were necessary to clarify the provision's terms and pre-
serve the statutory scheme. 135 However, "[w]hen the agency concludes that
a literal reading of a statute would thwart the purposes of Congress, it may
deviate no further from the statute than is needed to protect congressional
intent."136
The court reasoned that the FDA's regulation was clearly inconsistent
with the language of the statute, which plainly awarded exclusivity to the
generic that was first-in-time to file a patent challenge. 137 Therefore, the
court invalidated the FDA's successful defense requirement in favor of the
court's "wait and see" approach, which it reasoned was more consistent
with the statutory language because it did not hinge exclusivity awards
upon the first-filer's participation in litigation with the pioneer. 138 The
court's "wait and see" solution grants exclusivity to the generic that is first-
in-time to file an ANDA, consistently with the statutory text, and then re-
quires the FDA to stay any subsequent ANDA until the first-filer resolves
its suit. 139 If the first-filer loses, exclusivity does not apply; if it wins, ex-
clusivity applies. 140
The court's solution preserves exclusivity for a first-filer that is not
sued by the pioneer, ensuring that the first-filer receives the statutory re-
ward for bringing an early challenge to the pioneer's patent. 14 1 As long as
132. See id.
133. Id.
134. Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
135. Id. at 1071. To solve the problem of the first-filer that is never sued, the court discussed the
possibility of requiring only that the first-filer be sued within forty-five days of filing instead of requir-
ing a complete successful defense. Id. Alternatively, the court suggested that the FDA could prescribe a
time-limit during which the non-sued first-filer must bring its product to market to maintain its right to
exclusivity. Id. at 1071 n.l 1. As to a first-filer that loses its suit, the court pointed to an FDA regulation
that required the first-filer to withdraw its paragraph IV certification and make a new certification under
paragraph III, and proposed that the FDA interpret the regulation to render the exclusivity period inap-
plicable after such an amendment. Id. at 1071.
136. Id. at 1068.
137. Id. at 1069.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See id.
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that first-filer brings its product to market, it will produce the desired public
benefit by providing early access to its generic drug. In this way, the
court's solution corrected an undesirable result of the FDA's successful
defense requirement.
However, the court's solution created two problems with the statutory
scheme. First, the court's "wait and see" approach requires a second-filer
that is not sued, and is therefore capable of entering the market, to wait
indefinitely for the resolution of the first-filer's suit before it can do so.142
This "meritorious second applicant" is prevented from bringing its drug to
market, even though it is the first generic capable of doing so, because the
FDA must preserve the exclusivity of the first-filer until the first-filer re-
solves its litigation. 143 The public is thereby denied the earliest possible
access to a generic drug.144
Congress intended the Act to facilitate the earliest possible market en-
try of generic drugs and included the generic exclusivity provision as one
way to facilitate that goal, not undermine it. The court admitted that its
"wait and see" solution produced a situation in which "the public is de-
prived of the fruits of [the second applicant's] ingenuity-a result seem-
ingly at odds with Congress's apparent [purpose] ... of rewarding
innovation and bringing generic drugs to market quickly."' 145 In the case of
a meritorious second applicant, preservation of the first-filer's generic ex-
clusivity should yield to the public interest in access to that second appli-
cant's product.146 Although the court refused to accept the FDA's
successful defense requirement, it did not "foreclose the FDA from at-
tempting to address the problem of the meritorious second applicant in
some narrower way, as long as that solution conforms to the statute. ' 147
The second problem created by the court's "wait and see" approach
gives the pioneer a large degree of control over the generic market, creating
the exact problem the D.C. District Court was concerned about in In-
wood.148 The pioneer may sue the first-filer, preserving its own monopoly
and staying FDA-approval of the first-filer's ADNA for thirty months, and
then elect not to sue later generics, saving itself from additional litigation
142. Id. at 1069.
143. Id. at 1072, 1074.
144. Id. at 1072.
145. Id.
146. See 149 CONG. REC. S16104, 16105-16106 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2003) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
147. Mova Pharm., 140 F.3d at 1074.
148. The Inwood court expressed concern over the pioneer manipulating the generic exclusivity
provision to prevent generic competition. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Young, 723 F. Supp. 1523, 1526-27
(D.D.C. 1989).
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while freezing the entire generic market for the duration of its litigation
with the first-filer.
C. The FDA's Elimination of the Successful Defense Requirement and the
Judicial Response
In June 1998, approximately two months after the appellate decision
in Mova,149 the FDA issued an industry-wide guidance concerning the ap-
plication of generic exclusivity in light of the court's invalidation of its
successful defense requirement.150 Until it officially removed the old re-
quirement from the regulatory scheme, the FDA indicated that it would
"regulate directly from the statute" and "make decisions on 180-day ge-
neric drug exclusivity on a case-by-case basis."' 151 The FDA specifically
indicated that the first-filer would receive exclusivity upon filing its
ANDA, regardless of whether it was sued. 152 Shortly thereafter, in its
Purepac decision, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the FDA's
industry guidance had effectively eliminated the successful defense re-
quirement and confirmed that the first-filer did not need to be sued in order
to receive exclusivity rights. 153
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF GENERIC EXCLUSIVITY LAW
A. Forfeiture and Exclusivity Triggers
In 2003, Congress passed several amendments to the Act that have
substantially changed the exclusivity provisions. The amendments detail
149. In the meantime, the Fourth Circuit had also invalidated the FDA's successful defense re-
quirement in a 1998 case, although its decision was never published. Granutec, Inc. v. Shalala , Nos.
97-1873, 97-1874, 1998 WL 153410, at *7 (4thCir. Apr. 3, 1998).
150. CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: 180-DAY GENERIC DRUG EXCLUSIVITY UNDER THE HATCH-
WAXMAN AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT 1 (1998), available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/2576fnl.pdf.
151. Id. at4.
152. Id. at 4-5.
153. Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Friedman, 162 F.3d 1201, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Purepac was the
second generic manufacturer to file an ANDA on a pioneer patent, and although its application was
tentatively approved by the FDA, final approval was stayed pending the completion of the first-filer's
exclusivity period. Id. at 1202. The first-filer was not sued by the pioneer, but its ANDA had not yet
been fully approved by the FDA, so it could not yet market its product. Id. Thus, its exclusivity period
had not yet begun to run. Id. Purepac argued that although the court's Mova decision eliminated the
successful defense requirement, it did not eliminate the lawsuit requirement all together, and that the
FDA therefore had no grounds to award exclusivity to a first-filer who had not been sued at all. Id. at
1204. The court disagreed and held that the FDA regulations were properly in line with the plain lan-
guage of the statute. Id. at 1205.
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many circumstances under which the first-filer will forfeit its exclusiv-
ity.154 First, the first-filer forfeits its exclusivity if it fails to market the drug
by the later of (1) seventy-five days after the date on which (a) approval of
its application is effective, or (b) thirty months after its application was
submitted, whichever is earlier; or (2) seventy-five days after the date on
which (a) a court has found the patent invalid or not infringed, (b) a court
has signed a settlement order or consent decree finding the patent invalid or
not infringed, or (c) the patentee has withdrawn the patent information
pertaining to the approved NDA. 155
In other words, the first section of the provision gives the first-filer
that has not been sued seventy-five days from the date of its ANDA ap-
proval to begin its exclusive commercial marketing.156 This provision pre-
vents the first-filer from sitting on its exclusivity and delaying market entry
by subsequent generics. 157 If the first-filer does not enter the market within
seventy-five days, exclusivity is forfeited and other generics are immedi-
ately able to enter the market. 158 The first section may also apply when the
first-filer has been sued, and its ANDA is therefore stayed for thirty
months. If the litigation is resolved (and the ANDA is therefore approved)
more than seventy-five days before expiration of the automatic thirty-
month stay, the first-filer must enter the market within seventy-five days of
that resolution. 159 If the litigation is not resolved before expiration of the
thirty-month stay, although the ANDA may be automatically approved by
the FDA, the court will look to the second section of the forfeiture provi-
sion, which provides a later marketing deadline.160
According to the second section of the forfeiture provisions, the first-
filer may wait to go to market until seventy-five days after (1) the patentee
withdraws its NDA patent information; (2) the court signs a settlement
decree that its patent is invalid or not infringed; or (3) the litigation con-
154. See Lietzan, supra note 94, at 288-89.
155. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(1) (2005).
156. Id.
157. This provision solves one of the problems that motivated the FDA's successful defense re-
quirement because it prevents the non-sued first-filer from preserving its exclusivity indefinitely until it
decides to begin commercially marketing its product. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations,
54 Fed. Reg. 28872, 28894 (proposed July 10, 1989) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 10, 310, 314,
320).
158. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(aa)(AA) (stating that if the first-filer that is not sued by the
pioneer has seventy-five days after the forty-five day window has lapsed to begin to market); Id.
§ 355(j)(5)(D)(iii) (stating that if the first-filer forfeits its exclusivity no other generic is eligible for
exclusivity).
159. Id. §§ 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(1)(aa)(AA)-(BB).
160. Forfeiture occurs if the first-filer fails to market its product by the later of the first and second
sections of the "failure to market" provision. Id. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I).
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cludes and the patent is held invalid or not infringed. 161 This provision
further confirms that Congress sought to preserve exclusivity beyond the
date of ANDA approval in order to encourage the first-filer to remain off of
the market until its litigation concluded. Preservation of exclusivity is justi-
fied in this scenario because the first-filer may still be the first to success-
fully bring a generic product to market.
Additionally, exclusivity is forfeited if the first-filer (1) withdraws its
application or the application is considered withdrawn for failing to meet
the requirements for approval; (2) amends or withdraws its paragraph IV
certifications that qualified it for exclusivity; (3) fails to obtain tentative
approval of its application within thirty months after it was filed (unless
that failure was caused by a change in requirements for approval after the
application was filed); (4) enters into an agreement with another ANDA
applicant, the NDA holder, or a patent holder, and the Federal Trade Com-
mission or a court finds that the agreement violates antitrust laws; or (5)
does not begin its exclusivity before all the patents as to which it filed a
paragraph IV certification have expired.162 In the case of any forfeiture by
the first-filer, the exclusivity period itself is also forfeited and will not "roll
over" to any subsequent generic who files an ANDA. 163
B. Inadequacies of the Amendments
One of Congress's primary goals in passing the Act was to strike a
balance between the needs of research-based pharmaceutical firms and
generic firms so that both would have the incentive necessary to continue
to produce and distribute the drugs that the American public needs. 164 As a
corollary to that goal, Congress intended to create an atmosphere that
would encourage generics to challenge patents during their terms and bring
low-cost generic drugs to consumers earlier.' 65 Congress's passage of the
2003 amendments reemphasized this purpose and brought the focus back to
the needs of the consumers for whom the Act was created. Specifically,
Congress's amendments indicate its intolerance for delay caused by the
generic exclusivity provision. The forfeiture provisions clearly indicate that
the first-filer's exclusivity is not intended as an absolute guarantee but is
161. Id. §§ 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(AA)-(CC).
162. Id. §§ 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(II)-(V).
163. Id. § 355(j)(5)(D)(iii).
164. 149 CONG. REc. S16104, 16104 (daily ed. Dec. 9,2003) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
165. Id. at 16104-16105.
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meant to yield if that exclusivity produces delay in consumer access to
generic drug products.166
The 2003 amendments correct the main concern that motivated the
FDA to promulgate the successful defense requirement because they pre-
vent the abuses that might otherwise result from an award of exclusivity to
a first-filer that is not sued by the pioneer. 167 However, the amendments
provide a more narrow solution to those problems than did the FDA be-
cause the amendments adhere to the plain language of the exclusivity pro-
vision and appropriately further the Act's policy. Consistent with the plain
language of the provision, and unlike the successful defense requirement,
the amendments do not deny the grant of exclusivity to the generic that is
first-in-time to file its ANDA.168 The amendments do provide that a first-
filer that either colludes with the pioneer to stay off the market, or other-
wise unnecessarily delays its commercial marketing, will forfeit its exclu-
sivity.169 Therefore, the first-filer loses its statutory right to exclusivity only
when it uses that exclusivity in a manner contrary to the purposes of the
Act. The 2003 amendments ensure that the exclusivity functions in accor-
dance with the plain language of the provision itself and with congressional
policy: the first-filer that provides the public with generic competition re-
ceives exclusivity, regardless of whether it produces that public benefit
through successful defense of a lawsuit or successful avoidance of a
lawsuit.
On the other hand, the 2003 amendments do not correct the problems
created by D.C. Circuit's "wait and see" application of the provision. The
problem of the meritorious second applicant survived the congressional
amendments, and further action is needed to correct it.170 The amendments
emphasize the policy of the exclusivity provision: the first-in-time to file
will automatically receive exclusivity, but will forfeit its exclusivity once it
becomes clear that preservation is not facilitating earlier generic competi-
tion. Because the existence of a meritorious second applicant is one such
166. See id. at 16105-16106.
167. 21 U.S.C § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I) (stating that the first-filer that is not sued forfeits its right to
exclusivity if it does not bring its product to market within seventy-five days of its ANDA approval
date); id. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(V) (the first-filer forfeits its exclusivity if it enters into an agreement with the
pioneer that violates antitrust laws).
168. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I).
169. Id. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I) (stating that the first-filer that is not sued forfeits its right to exclusivity
if it does not bring its product to market within seventy-five days of its ANDA approval date); id.
§ 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(V) (stating that the first-filer forfeits its exclusivity if it enters into an agreement with
the pioneer that violates antitrust laws).
170. Senator Hatch has specifically discussed the problem of the meritorious second applicant that
was created by the D.C. Circuit's decision in the Mova case. See 149 CONG. REc. at 16105.
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circumstance, it must be added to the list of events that will forfeit the first-
filer's exclusivity. 17 1
The first-filer that is not sued receives exclusivity because it is able to
bring its product to market and produce the public benefit of generic com-
petition; the first-filer that is entrenched in litigation when its ANDA is
approved maintains exclusivity because it is working to produce that same
public benefit and may still be the first to do so. 172 The D.C. Circuit en-
sured these congruent results by invalidating the FDA's successful defense
requirement. 173 The 2003 amendments provide that the first-filer that is not
sued forfeits its exclusivity once it becomes apparent that its exclusivity
will produce no public benefit. 174 Now, further amendment is necessary to
ensure a congruent result in the case of the first-filer that is entrenched in
litigation. The first-filer that is entrenched in litigation should similarly
forfeit its exclusivity once it becomes apparent that its exclusivity will pro-
duce no public benefit-in other words, when a meritorious second appli-
cant is ready to bring its product to market before the first-filer. 175
Otherwise, the exclusivity provision creates an entitlement for the first-filer
at the expense of other generic firms and the public alike. 176
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: EXCLUSIVITY FORFEITED BY AN
INTERVENING SUCCESSFUL CHALLENGER
In order to ensure that United States courts apply the exclusivity pro-
visions of the Act in a way that best furthers the Act's underlying policies
and protects the interests of both generic manufacturers and the public,
Congress should amend the Act to provide forfeiture of the first-filer's
exclusivity when the first-filer is not the first generic to successfully chal-
lenge the pioneer patent. This action would remedy past misinterpretations
and applications of the Act and ensure that future exclusivity awards act as
an incentive to further the policies of the Act.
One of Congress's central goals in promulgating the Act was to pro-
vide the public with earlier access to low-cost generic drugs. 177 However,
171. Id. at 16105-16106.
172. See Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (explaining why the
first-filer that is entrenched in litigation maintains exclusivity); See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Young, 723 F.
Supp. 1523, 1526 (D.D.C. 1989) (explaining why the first-filer that is not sued receives exclusivity).
173. MovaPharm., 140 F.3dat 1076.
174. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I) (2005).
175. 149 CONG. REC. at 16105-16106.
176. See id.
177. See Fed. Trade Comm'n., Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study i-ii
(2002).
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in order for a generic to challenge the pioneer patent, the generic must as-
sume the risk of litigation with the pioneer and the expense necessary both
to complete its ANDA and evaluate the validity and infringement of the
pioneer patent. Congress enacted the generic exclusivity provision to coun-
teract the deterrent effect created by that risk and expense.178 By its plain
language, this provision provides market exclusivity to any generic that is
the first-to-file a challenge to a pioneer patent. 179 However, since the provi-
sion's enactment, the FDA and courts alike have realized that exclusivity
awards based on that simple language alone produce unintended conse-
quences. Different FDA regulations, judicial interpretations, and congres-
sional amendments have attempted to reconcile that language with the
Act's purposes. 180
Three problematic scenarios result from completely unfettered awards
of exclusivity to the generic that is first-in-time to file. First, if the first-filer
is sued by the patentee and loses the lawsuit, the first-filer remains unable
to market its infringing product prior to patent expiration, and is therefore
unable to trigger its exclusivity, excluding all other generics from the mar-
ket until the patent expires as well. 181 Second, if the first-filer is sued by the
patentee and remains in litigation when a second-filer completes its ANDA,
is not sued by the pioneer, and is ready to go to market, the public is denied
access to that second-filer's generic product even though the first-filer is
unable to market its own product. 182 Finally, if the first-filer is not sued by
the pioneer, the first-filer may remain off the market indefinitely, excluding
all other generics from the market until it decides to commercially market
its own product. 183 The first and third problems have been solved by regu-
lation 84 or amendment, 185 but the second problem remains and must be
corrected. 186
Because Congress intended the Act to produce earlier generic market
entry, the generic exclusivity provision should not be applied to excuse
178. See id.
179. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I) (2005).
180. See id. § 355(j)(5)(D) (recent forfeiture amendments); Mova Pharm., 140 F.3d at 1069-72
(court's interpretation); Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations; Patent and Exclusivity Provi-
sions, 59 Fed. Reg. 50338, 50353 (Oct. 3, 1994) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314) (FDA interpreta-
tion).
181. Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
182. Id. at 1072.
183. ld. at 1067.
184. FDA regulation requires that a first-filer that loses its suit must amend its certification to make
a new paragraph III certification, forfeiting its right to exclusivity. Id. at 1071 & n. 12 (citing 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.94(a)(12)(viii)(A)).
185. 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(5)(D) (2005).
186. 149 CONG. REC. S16104, 16105-16106 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2003) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
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unnecessary delay in that market entry.187 So long as the first-filer remains
able to be the first generic to bring its product to market, it is entitled to
have its exclusivity preserved. This is illustrated by Congress's inclusion of
the commercial marketing trigger, which preserves exclusivity throughout
the pendancy of the first-filer's litigation despite the FDA's approval of the
first-filer's ANDA. 188 In that case, the reward of exclusivity is not denied
to the first-filer because the first-filer is still capable of fulfilling the Act's
purpose and is in the process of attempting to do So. 189 However, once a
meritorious second applicant is able to antedate the first-filer's market en-
try, the public interest in the earliest possible access to a generic product
outweighs its interest in preservation of the first-filer's exclusivity. 190
Therefore, the presence of a meritorious second applicant should forfeit the
first-filer's exclusivity, allowing the second-applicant to immediately begin
marketing its product.191
This change is in accordance with the 2003 amendments to the Act,
which illustrate that Congress is intolerant of delay that is not necessary to
fulfill the Act's purposes. When a first-filer colludes with the pioneer or
otherwise unnecessarily delays its market entry, it is denied exclusivity.192
In providing for this result, Congress affirmed that exclusivity is not an
entitlement of the first-filer, but a reward provided for creating a public
benefit. 193 Congress thus created a balance between the first-filer's right to
exclusivity and the public's interest in access to generic drugs: exclusivity
will be preserved only so long as the first-filer's delay in market entry is
reasonable and does not unnecessarily prevent generic competition.
The current "wait and see" approach, although improved by the 2003
amendments, still allows for unreasonable delay in generic market entry.
As Senator Hatch recently confirmed on the Senate floor, the meritorious
second applicant problem remains despite the new forfeiture provisions. 194
The meritorious second applicant is denied the ability to bring its product
to market despite the fact that it has invested its time and money and has
187. See id.
188. See Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. 28872, 28894 (proposed
July 10, 1989) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 10, 310, 314, 320).
189. Id.
190. 149 CONG. REC. at 16105-16106.
191. Seeid.
192. 21 U.S.C § 3550)(5)(D)(i)(1) (2005) (stating that the first-filer that is not sued forfeits its right
to exclusivity if it does not bring its product to market within seventy-five days of its ANDA approval
date); id. § 355 0)(5)(D)(i)(V) (the first-filer forfeits its exclusivity if it enters into an agreement with
the pioneer that violates antitrust laws).
193. 149 CONG. REC. at 16105-16106.
194. Id. Senator Hatch is a Republican from Utah.
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assumed the risk of litigation in order to file its ANDA. 195 The public is
denied the benefit of access to a generic drug that is otherwise ready to be
marketed. 196 This result will be corrected by further amending the provi-
sion's language to provide that the first-filer forfeits its exclusivity if it is
not the first generic to successfully challenge a pioneer's patent. 197
A first-filer successfully challenges a patent when it invalidates or
successfully designs around a pioneer's drug patent. When the pioneer does
not sue the first-filer during the forty-five day window, the first-filer has
successfully challenged the patent and is entitled to exclusivity. The FDA's
successful defense requirement was improper because it did not allow this
result and thereby undermined both the incentive and reward functions of
the exclusivity provision. 198
A first-filer also successfully challenges the pioneer's patent when the
first-filer is sued by the pioneer during the forty-five day window but pre-
vails in the litigation, either by invalidating the pioneer patent or by prov-
ing that its product does not infringe. The commercial marketing trigger
currently preserves the first-filer's exclusivity throughout its litigation until
it is reasonably able to market its product, 199 but should only do so as long
as that preservation is in the public interest. As long as the first-filer may be
the first to bring a generic product onto the market, the public has an inter-
est in preserving its exclusivity. 200 On the other hand, when a second-filer
is able to bring its generic product to market before the first-filer, the public
does not have an interest in preserving the first-filer's exclusivity through
195. See Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (discussing unfair-
ness to the "ingenious second applicant").
196. Senator Hatch predicted that
the first time that a blockbuster product is kept off the market, perhaps for over a year, due to
the application of this new law [the "wait and see" approach] and there is a second generic
ready, able and willing to go to market, there will be a great public clamor, as there should be.
149 CONG. REC. at 16106.
197. Senator Hatch believes that exclusivity should only be granted to the "first successful chal-
lenger of a pioneer firm's patents." Id. at 16104-16105. Because the forfeiture solution proposed herein
does just that, resolving Senator's Hatch's main problem with "wait and see" application (the meritori-
ous second applicant), and does so in a way that is more consistent with the statutory language and
recent amendments than the FDA's successful defense requirement, he would likely be in support of
this more narrow solution.
198. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Young, 723 F. Supp. 1523, 1526 (D.D.C. 1989) (explaining that the
non-sued first-filer "successfully pursue[s] a patent infringement lawsuit and thereby open[s] up the
market to generic competition").
199. See Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. 28872, 28894 (proposed
July 10, 1989) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 10, 310, 314, 320) (explaining the function of the com-
mercial marketing trigger).
200. See id.
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the rest of the first-filer's litigation. 20 1 The public interest is in early acces-
sibility to a safe, low-cost generic product.202
Therefore, the FDA should be allowed to evaluate other generic AN-
DAs while the first-filer is in litigation.2 03 If a subsequent ANDA is ap-
proved by the FDA before the first-filer successfully challenges the pioneer
patent, a new forfeiture provision in the Act should provide that the first-
filer forfeits its exclusivity, allowing the approved product to come to mar-
ket.2 04 Congress could simply add this additional forfeiture provision to the
list already included in the Act as of 2003.205
This proposed provision would be somewhat of a compromise be-
tween the FDA's initial successful defense requirement and the D.C. Cir-
cuit's wait and see approach. It is consistent with the plain language of the
exclusivity provision because, unlike the FDA's regulation, it provides
exclusivity to the generic that is first-in-time to file an ANDA. It is also
most consistent with the policy of the Act as a whole: contrary to the
FDA's initial regulation, it preserves exclusivity for the deserving first-filer
that is not sued, and contrary to the D.C. Circuit Court's "wait and see"
requirement, it allows the meritorious second applicant to enter the market
and provide the public with the earliest possible access to safe, low-cost
generic drugs.
Furthermore, the new provision would produce other desirable results.
First, it would prevent gaming of the system by the pioneer firms. As dis-
cussed above, the "wait and see" approach allows the pioneer to exercise its
discretion in bringing suit against later generic applicants (once the pioneer
has sued the first-filer) because the pioneer knows that those generics will
remain frozen out of the market until resolution of the pioneer's litigation
with the first-filer. 206 This additional forfeiture provision, on the other
hand, forces the pioneer to sue any ANDA applicant that it believes in-
fringes. Otherwise, upon expiration of the forty-five day window, that sub-
sequently-filed ANDA will be approved and the generic will enter the
201. 149 CONG. REC. at 16105-16106.
202. See id.
203. This was how the FDA operated under its successful defense requirement, examining and
approving subsequent ANDAs in the midst of the first-filer's unresolved litigation with the pioneer. See
Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
204. As illustrated by the demise of the FDA's successful defense requirement, statutory amend-
ment, as opposed to FDA regulation, will ensure judicial compliance with this policy and is therefore a
desirable solution to the problem. See id. at 1076 (enjoining the FDA's application of its successful
defense requirement).
205. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(l)-(VI) (2005) (listing various circumstances that result in
forfeiture of the first-filer's exclusivity). Also, Congress may be willing to reevaluate the statute and
make an amendment. See 149 CONG. REC. at 16105.
206. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(1).
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market, destroying the pioneer's monopoly.207 Subsequent generics will
simultaneously be deterred from filing frivolous ANDAs because of the
increased risk of litigation with the pioneer.
Second, the additional forfeiture provision will produce more patent
challenges because it will provide an incentive for generics to challenge the
pioneer's patent even when those generics will not be the first-filer.208 Sub-
sequent generics will have an increased incentive to file a legitimate
ANDA if they know that they will not be forced to "wait and see" what
happens with the first-filer's litigation before they are able to enter the
market.
CONCLUSION
Congress should amend the Hatch-Waxman Act to provide forfeiture
of the first-filer's exclusivity when it is not the first generic to successfully
challenge the pioneer patent. This amendment reconciles exclusivity
awards with the Act's underlying purpose because it ensures that exclusiv-
ity awards do not delay generic competition; it prevents gaming of the sys-
tem because it decreases frivolous ANDAs and eliminates the pioneer's
ability to conveniently exercise its discretion in bringing suit; and it best
promotes the public interest because it provides a strong incentive for ge-
nerics to continue to challenge pioneer patents. As explained by Senator
Hatch himself, "the rationale behind the 180-day provision is to create an
incentive for challenges to the pioneer's patents, not to create an entitle-
ment to the first applicant to file a patent challenge with the FDA in the
Parklawn Building. '209
207. The FDA can immediately approve an ANDA once the forty-five days pass without the pio-
neer filing suit. Id. § 355 (j)(5)(B)(iii).
208. It is also possible that the exclusivity provision should be amended to provide exclusivity to
the first generic to make a successful challenge of the pioneer patent, regardless of whether that generic
was the first-in-time to attempt to do so. Cf 149 CONG. REc. at 16106 (discussing the possibility of
awarding exclusivity to a subsequent-filer that is the first to successfully invalidate the pioneer patent).
This would further increase incentive for generic challenges.
209. Id. at 16105-16106.
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